A Game Theoretic Approach to a Retail Electricity Market with a High Penetration of Small and Mid-Size Renewable Suppliers
Date
2016-04
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
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Publisher
Kazuo Inamori School of Engineering at Alfred University.
Abstract
Game theory has provided a practical tool to model players’ strategic behavior in
electricity markets. In this work, a retail electricity market with a high penetration of
renewable resources is modeled. Using game theory, the hourly clearing electricity
prices, as well as the optimum behavior of market participants are obtained. In this
model, which is inspired by the “Energy Internet” concept, consumers play an active role
in managing their load demands. This highly dynamic model allows us to analyze
consumers’ reaction to price fluctuations. Spot pricing, which is employed here to model
the electricity market, can make consumers react to the high electricity prices. This is
particularly important in the demand side management, where consumers should modify
their demand through financial incentives. Two types of active players are considered in
this electricity market: small electricity suppliers and consumers. Electricity grid acts as
an Independent system operator and is considered to be a complementary unit to
compensate for the deficiency of power from small suppliers. The problem is formulated
mathematically and a design of experiment (DOE) approach is employed to find the
rational reaction set (RRS) of market participants. The intersection of these sets provides
the Nash Equilibrium.
Description
Advisory committee members: Jalal Baghdadchi, Wallace Leigh. Dissertation completed in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Science in Mechanical Engineering at the Kazuo Inamori School of Engineering at Alfred University
Type
Thesis